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Abstract 
This paper aims to understand whether people follow Bayes’ Rule to update beliefs about 
important attributes they do not know much about. If they fail to Bayesian update their 
beliefs, the paper investigates how the external environment, good news versus bad news, 
risk levels, and the imperfect memory factor contribute to the departure from Bayes Rule. An 
experimental approach is used to recreate a simplified entrepreneurship scenario in the 
laboratory environment which was implemented through oTree. 249 participants were 
recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Findings in this paper suggest that people with 
Low ability have tendency toward overconfidence which persists in all three treatments, 
under any economic environment, and given good news or bad news. People with High 
ability, however, have tendency toward underconfidence but become less underconfident 
under lower risk environment. The surprising result is that people with Medium ability 
become overconfident under the lower risk environment. Additionally, this paper uses probit 
models and finds that perfect memory condition and lower risk environment increase the 
likelihood of taking risk.  
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1 Introduction  
 In the Ten-Year Outlook on Research Opportunities in the Behavioral and Social 
Science, Machina, Hogarth, MacCrimmon, Roberts, Roth, Slovic, and Thaler (1985) 
mentions that “the existence of agents who systematically violate the expected utility axioms 
and Bayes’ rule raises many questions for economic theory and practice”(p. 6). As a result, 
this paper empirically investigates whether departure from Bayes Rule happens when people 
update beliefs about attributes that they care about but do not know much but care about. It, 
first, proposes two sources of overconfident beliefs when agents fail to update their beliefs 
following Bayes’ Rule. Agents can become overconfident, more specifically, overestimate 
their ability, when they take all the credit from luck and blame their false to adverse external 
environment. Also, when processing news about themselves, agents may pay more attention 
to information that supports their prior beliefs and enhance their self-view. We use an 
experimental approach to attain valid conclusions for this paper. By using Bayes’ Rule, we 
can easily compute the true beliefs and compare them with actual beliefs from the experiment 
to confirm the existence of overconfidence and explains how overconfidence is formed and 
affected by various factors. 
To reflect reality, this paper considers beliefs updating under different levels of risk. 
What role does risk play in beliefs updating? On one side, some argue that under higher risk 
environment, people might be more cautious and make more thoughtful decisions. On the 
other side, however, higher risk and volatile environment can provide extra noise and 
accidental success may lead agents to have over optimistic expectations about the future.  
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According to Greenwood and Stefan (2009), younger mutual fund managers tend to 
disproportionately bet on technology stocks during the technology bubbles and increased 
their technology stocks holding after observing high return. It emphasized the fact that young 
managers did not exhibit better skills at picking well-performing stocks. It provides a 
conjecture for the role of risk in belief updating. It is possible that younger mutual fund 
managers are inexperienced investors, which means they have little knowledge of their 
relative skills levels in picking well-performing stocks, compared to older mutual fund 
managers. Then, when facing the technology bubble, which was a higher risk environment, 
young managers received occasional signals of very high return and thus, adjusted their 
expectations for future return, failing to recognize the environmental factor and therefore, 
became overconfident. In this paper, having treatments with different levels of risk in the 
experiment is able to tell us whether higher risk increases or decreases degree of 
overconfidence among agents. 
While knowing that people present overconfident beliefs and confirmation bias in 
processing new information, which eventually affects their decision making, it is crucial to 
understand why people fail to follow Bayes’ Rule when updating their beliefs. It could be that 
their limited rationality restricts them from calculating the probabilities correctly. The 
explanation could also be that agents are rational and evaluate a trade-off between making the 
right choice from true beliefs and hedonic values from falsely positive self-view. To find the 
motivation of non-Bayesian updating, the paper will use data from the experiment to see 
whether people would follow Bayes’ Rule when receiving good news. Another possibility for 
failure to Bayesian updating can come from the fact the people have limited memory 
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capacity. If we can always remember all the information we encounter, could we still pick 
some of them to update our beliefs on and neglect the rest? In other words, assuming that we 
incorporate all information into our beliefs impartially, does it mean that we always follow 
Bayes’ Rule? Even though this question could not be answered in the real life, perfect 
memory condition can be easily created in the experiment. As a result, the experimental 
approach can also provide evidence to support this hypothesis.  
 The motivation behind this research is to understand individual decision making. It has 
real world applications, for example, helping individuals to decide whether to enter 
entrepreneurship. This paper can help explain anomaly individual choices if they are related 
to self-attribute and self-view. It also provides empirical evidence on overconfidence, 
specifically, on overestimation. This paper finds that people with low ability tend to be 
overestimate themselves all the time, while people with high ability tend to be underconfident 
given good news. Better understanding of agents’ tendency to overestimate their ability could 
help themselves make better and more efficient decisions. For example, being overconfident 
about the ability to earn lot of money can lead to poor consumption choices. Another example 
could be that students sometimes are overconfident about their performance in the class 
despite all the signals from homework or exam grades. Recognizing the tendency to be 
overconfident may help some students work harder.  
 This paper contributes to current literature through taking risk factor into consideration. 
It argues that even though in Bayes’ Rule, risk does not directly affect the calculation at all, it 
affects probabilities of success and could cause agents move even further away from 
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Bayesian updating. Essentially, the hypotheses this paper tests give different possible answers 
on why Bayes’ Rule fail to explain human behaviors in the real life. It can be agents gain 
utility not solely from making the right choice but also from self-deception. Limitation of 
intrinsic skills and ability may prevent agents from Bayesian updating. Also, unlike other 
experimental literature, the experiment design in this paper uses a personal attribute (ability 
to start a new business) that participants care about so that beliefs have direct importance and 
participants are more motivated to use Bayes Rule for higher payoff instead of using the rule 
of thumb. Also, it employs objective information structure: outcomes of decisions are 
determined by the designed probability of success and ability level which is set by an 
economic literacy test so that participants could not simply come out with a subjective view 
on the ability distribution.  
 The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 is a literature review on Bayesian updating, 
evidence of cognitive biases, and bounded rationality. Section 3 describes the hypotheses this 
paper tests on with greater details. Section 4 presents the experimental design and Section 6 
summarizes main results. The last section discusses conclusion and policy implications.  
 
2 Literature Review 
 While there is abundant evidence on overconfidence and confirmation bias, it is noted that 
theoretical and empirical evidence are based on different assumptions and adopted rather 
diverse experimental design. Similarly for Bayes’ Rule, even though there are evidence 
showing that subjects in the experiment failed to perform the correct calculation, many 
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economists modelled behavioral biases under the assumption that agents are Bayesian. Below 
is a selection of work that is related to my research questions.  
2.1 Overconfidence and Confirmation Bias 
 Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) presents a formal model of subjective beliefs, arguing 
that agents are forward-looking and gain anticipatory utility from overconfident beliefs but 
bearing the future cost of wrong decisions. Van Den Steen (2004) focuses on the agents’ choice 
of action, where beliefs are relevant, suggesting that unlike pure motivational theory, Bayesian 
agents could become rational from others’ priors. Although both models build on different 
assumption, they both concluded agents’ tendency to become over-optimistic.  
 Köszegi (2006) studies the “ego utility” model, where agents’ beliefs about their self-
image enter the utility function directly. His model has application to small business, 
arguing that entrepreneurs might derive utility from positive future outlook and therefore 
are overconfident about their ability to run a business. Since running a small business is 
informative about their skill levels, due to self-image protection, agents may choose not to 
start a new business even though they should, and due to self-image enhancement, agents 
may stay in the business for too long trying to regain a positive self-image. It shares similar 
hypothesis with this paper that agents may sacrifice the option of making the right choice 
and would rather have better feeling about themselves.  
Rabin and Schrag (1999) presents a model for confirmation bias, an example of the 
departure from Bayesian updating. Agents in the model follow Bayes’ Rule in beliefs updating 
but misread the signal to confirm their prior beliefs. More importantly, this paper have shown 
10 
 
that this kind of “wrongness” arises from weak, unclear evidence. Then, Eli and Rao (2011) 
provided some empirical evidence supporting the model of confirmation bias. It pointed out 
that even though some studies showed subjects deviated from Bayes’ Rule when updating their 
beliefs, questions used does not affect utility directly. The design of their experiment, instead, 
considers the interaction between preferences and beliefs. Their results indicate that subjects 
incorporated favorable news quite closely following Bayes’ Rule but had unrelated posterior 
beliefs uncorrelated with Bayesian inference when processing unfavorable news. As a result, 
it is unclear that if agents are capable of following Bayes’ Rule, then for what reasons that they 
choose not to? 
2.2 Imperfect Memory 
 Gottlieb (2014) shows a model of decision making with imperfect memory and self-
deception. This paper presents consistent results with other studies, concluding that agents tend 
to remember good news but forget bad news. It argues that if agents with perfect memory, then 
the cost of memory manipulation would be infinitely large. Though there is not efficient tool 
to detect and measure the level of self-deception, experiment in my paper partially provide 
empirical evidence as the results would verify whether agents would make the right choice and 
converge the true beliefs if they could no longer manipulate the memory.  
 Wilson (2014) develops a theoretical model on bounded memory and information 
processing and finds that agents with finite memory capacity optimally ignore all but the two 
most powerful opposing signals and when the agent has some prior beliefs in favor of some 
state of the world, signals supporting the opposite direction are generally forgotten. The paper 
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also suggests that optimal behaviors lead beliefs to be typically more extreme than Bayesian 
beliefs.  
2.3 Bayes’ Rule and Representativeness Heuristic 
Another important matter to address is whether it makes sense to conduct yet another 
experiment on Bayes’ Rule as some literature already point out that Bayesian updating is an 
unrealistic assumption. Violation of Bayes’ Rule could be that one does not consider prior 
beliefs but relied on the rule of thumb [e.g., Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Grether (1980)]. 
Also, Grether (1992) indicates that individuals use different decision rules in different decision 
situations. As a result, there is no clear evidence about why and when people move away from 
Bayes’ Rule. My experiment could potentially offer more insights into whether agents would 
actually apply Bayes’ Rule and what leads to the violation when beliefs are about important 
attributes as well as relate to monetary payoff. 
 
3 Conceptual Framework 
This section describes hypotheses that the experiment tests on with more details. The 
paper emphasizes the belief updating of agents’ own unknown attributes. Intuitively, when 
agents process new information about attributes that they care about but have little 
knowledge of, they would prefer information that enhances their self-view. When receiving 
information that hurts their self-view, agents may choose not to Bayesian update their beliefs 
if the cost of making the wrong decision due to the biased beliefs is lower than the benefit of 
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having a positive self-image. In other word, agents could be rational and update their beliefs 
in a way that maximize their utility level.  
Hypothesis 1: Entrepreneurship Model 
Individuals may update their beliefs following Bayes’ Rule during bad economic condition, 
but update their beliefs as if the economic condition is unknown during good economic 
condition.  
People are less likely to update their beliefs following Bayes’ Rule receiving negative 
outcomes than receiving positive outcomes 
The fist hypothesis is called the Entrepreneurship Model and mainly about how non-
Bayesian updating could lead agents to have overconfident beliefs. It is inspired by Gottlieb 
(2014), which proposes a model of imperfect memory and choice under risk and argues that 
since more favorable external conditions provide bad news about the agent’s performance, 
the agent may manipulate her memory to change how much she remembers the external 
condition. The intuition is that agents may prefer to remember the adverse external condition 
quite well because success under adverse external condition could reinforce the positive self-
view to a greater extend and failure under adverse external condition allows agents to easily 
find an excuse instead of blaming their own incompetency. Therefore, this paper expects to 
see people follow Bayes’ Rule under bad external environment and may fail to do so under 
good external environment. In addition, the paper will look at a second cause of 
overconfidence. Also, from Gottlieb (2014), its self-deception model rationalize that people 
forget bad news and remember good news. Therefore, the paper hypothesize that when agents 
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receive news about their certain attributes, they may present confirmation bias, only updating 
beliefs following Bayes’ Rule when the news supports their prior beliefs.  
Hypothesis 2: Beliefs updating and risk 
People are more overconfident under higher-risk environment 
People are more likely to choose to start a new business under higher-risk environment 
 In this paper, uncertainty is implied and comes from both unknown ability levels and 
external conditions because if the outcomes send a clear signal, then agents must surely know 
their ability level. For example, if agents know that only people with High ability can succeed 
in starting a new business and earn more than previous job, then their failure clearly indicate 
that they don’t have High ability and should not start a new business. However, even with 
uncertainty, agents can find out their actual skill levels by constant Bayesian updating by 
processing information about their skill levels. In the real world, besides uncertainty, people 
cope with risk in their everyday life. Risk is different from uncertainty: even though the 
outcome of starting a new business is unknown, the odds of success are clearly defined. The 
paper proposes that higher risk generated by larger variance of the distribution of return 
brings more noise and unclear signals, and therefore, enhances the departure from Bayesian. 
Additionally, the according to the empirical results in Camerer and Lovallo (1999), agents 
with tendency toward overconfidence would prefer riskier option because “they think they 
can beat the odds” (p. 315). Therefore, we have second part of the hypothesis that under high 
risk, people are more overconfident and thus, are more likely to choose the riskier option. 
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Hypothesis 3: Belief Updating and Perfect Memory 
People with perfect memory would update their beliefs following Bayes’ Rule 
People with perfect memory are less likely to choose to start a new business 
Furthermore, instead of arguing people fail to be follow Bayes’ Rule because they may 
not know how to calculate probabilities, this paper points out the additional explanation that 
people may fail to remember all prior information needed to update their beliefs correctly. To 
some extent, it relates to the idea of limitation of rationality that agents can never be fully 
rational. With limited memory capacity, people may tend to weigh more on new information 
that support their prior beliefs and enhance their self-view than on new information that 
contrast their former beliefs. If we assume that people have perfect memory, then the cost of 
manipulating their memory would be very infinitely large, so instead they should have correct 
prior information and the departure from Bayes’ Rule would need alternative explanations. 
 
4 Experimental Design 
 The purpose of the experiment is to test three hypotheses from the Conceptual 
Framework section about how people update beliefs about certain attributes they do not know 
much about. In the experiment, participants are asked to update beliefs about their ability to 
start a new business. This certain ability is chosen because it fits the purpose of this research 
and the experiment can recreate a simplified process of how people decide whether to enter 
into entrepreneurship in the laboratory environment. Also, the ability to start a new business 
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is evaluated by an economic literacy test at the beginning of the experiment. The correctness 
of participants’ answers will categorize them into High, Medium, or Low ability groups and 
every group is assigned different probability of success, which will determine their 
performance in starting a new business in later rounds. A belief question about self-
assessment of their ability will be asked to set the prior beliefs. Then, participants engage in 
multiple rounds of making a decision on whether to start a new business. After every 
decision, they will be presented the outcome, either success or failure, jointly with 
information about the economic environment so that participants can update their beliefs 
about their ability accordingly.  
I. Economic Literacy Test 
Questions in the economic literacy test of this experiment come from National Center for 
Education Statistics Database1. Questions were designed for grade 12 students, so questions 
with difficulty level of Medium or Hard are chosen. Since entrepreneurial behaviors are 
modelled in the experiment, most questions in the test concern the market economy and the 
national economy. Sample Questions are as following: (See full test see Appendix 1) 
 After watching part of a movie she rented, Samantha finds that it is not as good as she 
expected. Which of the following should she consider in deciding whether to continue 
watching the movie? 
 How would a large increase in the number of business and personal bankruptcies over 
                                                             
1 SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics, National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 2013 Reading Assessment. 
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several years tend to affect the interest rates that banks charge for loans? 
 Assume that the current interest rate is 7 percent and that the current rate of inflation 
is 3 percent. Under these conditions, which of the following is the real interest rate? 
II. Probability of Success 
 The outcome of every round, success or failure, depends on three factors, ability, 
economic condition, and risk level. Participants have their ability levels determined by their 
performance in the test and the economic environment of every round is randomly selected, 
with 50% chance for good economic environment. Intuitively, a person with High ability who 
chooses to start a business under a low-risk and good economic environment is more likely to 
success. Therefore, we follow that keeping other conditions constant, the higher the ability 
the participants have, the greater chance of succeeding they have. We also follow that keeping 
all other conditions constant, it is more likely to succeed under the good economic condition 
than in the bad economic condition.  
Since Bayes’ Rule indicates true beliefs, then knowing that it is easier to succeed under 
good economic decision, participants should update beliefs following that their success under 
bad economic environment would add greater weight for having High ability than under good 
economic environment. Namely, the design of probability of success in this experiment 
should have conditional probabilities, Pbad(𝐻|𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) > 𝑃𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑(𝐻|𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠), stating that the 
probability of the participant having High ability given success under bad economic 
environment is higher than the one under good economic environment. Similarly, if a 
participant fails under good economic environment, then she is more likely to have Low 
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ability compared to failing under bad economic. So, the design for probability of success 
should make sure that Pgood(𝐿|𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒) > 𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑑(𝐿|𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒), showing that the probability of 
the participant having Low ability given failure under good economic environment is greater 
than the one under bad economic environment. In addition, the design considers the 
probability of success under different levels of risk. We assume that the risk does not come 
from uncertainty about ability level or from unknown economic condition, but comes from a 
third source. It is measured as the total probability of success and higher risk means lower 
total probability of success. Hence, we have the following two tables: 
Table 1. High-Risk Scenario 
  Ability 
  H M L 
Economic conditions 
Good 0.9 0.8 0.4 
Bad 0.8 0.5 0.2 
 
Table 2. Low-Risk Scenario 
  Ability 
  H M L 
Economic conditions 
Good 0.95 0.9 0.65 
Bad 0.9 0.7 0.4 
 
III. Treatments 
Participants are divided into 3 different groups as following:  
High Risk Low Risk 
Perfect Memory Imperfect Memory Imperfect Memory 
Low Risk and High Risk treatments control for different levels of risk. Within the high-
risk treatment group, we are adding another control variable to see the effect of perfect 
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memory in belief updating. Participants in perfect memory group will have information about 
the outcome of previous rounds and corresponding economic conditions on their screen 
throughout the experiment. In contrast, participants in other two groups labelled as imperfect 
memory groups will have to rely on their own memory capacity to remember the outcomes 
and respective external environment.  
IV. Belief Questions 
The goal of this experiment is to examine whether people overestimate their ability level 
and how external environment and good news and bad news affect Bayesian updating. As a 
result, it is import to know participants’ initial beliefs and belief updating behaviors after 
every round of decision. We want to know what percentages they distribute to three ability 
levels with these percentages adding up to 100%. In other word, how certain the participant is 
that he/she has High, Medium, and Low ability?  
The prior belief in the beginning is set up by asking a belief question right after the test. 
Then, at the end of every round, the same belief question is asked again. In every round, the 
answers to the belief question become the prior belief for next round. Participants should 
follow Bayes’ Rule to update their belief again in the next round based on the outcome in the 
current round as well as on the prior beliefs from previous round. Before updating their 
belief, participants will be presented with the outcome of their decision and the economic 
condition under which they choose to start a new business. It is reasonable to show economic 
environment after participants make a decision not only because in the real world, usually it 
is hard to tell whether the current stage of economy or policies promotes start-up but also 
19 
 
because we want to see the effect of external condition on belief updating and not on decision 
making. 
V. Ordering of the experiment2 
In Stage 0, participants will complete an economic literacy test and the program for the 
experiment will label them having High, Medium or Lowing ability according to a designed 
cutoff standard3. Then, they will answer a question about their initial beliefs about ability 
levels given the outcome of this round, for example, 
 
In Stage 1, participants in the Treatment group will choose whether to start a new 
business or not. The table below gives details about the payoff from the decision.  
Table 3. Payoff from Success, Failure or Not Start A Business 
  Not Start A New Business Success Failure 
Low-Risk $1  $1.20  $0.80  
High-Risk $1  $1.50  $0.60  
 
All participants will also need to answer a belief question after observing the outcome 
and corresponding economic condition and have monetary incentive to answer the question 
as correctly as possible. They will receive payoff based on how close their answers are to the 
true belief. Let πH, πM, πL be participants’ answers in the belief question and rH, rM, rL 
                                                             
2 See Appendix 2 for detailed instructions and screenshots of the experiment 
3 High: 90% - 100% Medium: 50% - 90% Low: 0 – 50%; The cutoff is determined by a pilot test.  
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represent their actual ability. If the participant actually has High ability, rH is then set to 1 
and the other two are zero. Then, the formula below will give a number w, indicating the 
accuracy of their beliefs and the payoff will be $w.  
1 −
1
2
(𝜋𝐻 − 𝑟𝐻)
2 −
1
2
(𝜋𝑀 − 𝑟𝑀)
2 −
1
2
(𝜋𝐿 − 𝑟𝐿)
2 
Their final payoff is the sum of payoff from one out of eight belief questions and payoff from 
one out of seven decisions. The paying rounds for the belief question and for the decision are 
randomly selected.  
In Stage 2, only participants in the imperfect memory category need to answer two 
questions as following: 
 
Finally, after being told their final payoff, all participants are asked to provide 
demographic information about race, gender, age, and income levels.  
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5 Result 
There are 249 subjects who participated in this experiment. Participants were recruited 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. To be allowed to participate in this experiment, subjects 
must be older than 18 years old, have a record of 95% approval rate from past tasks, and 
locate in the US. Every participant was assigned a qualification number so that they were not 
able to repeat the experiment with the same account. While it is possible that subjects may 
create multiple accounts under financial incentives, the maximum monetary payoff of this 
experiment is $3. The setting of my posting on Mechanical Turk prevents new accounts from 
taking my experiment and IP address and length of time spent in the experiment are checked 
to ensure that same subjects are not recorded twice in the data.  
When accepting to participate in the experiment, subjects are randomly assigned to one 
of the three treatments. During the process of data collection, from inspecting the data, I 
found more subjects in the High Risk & Imperfect Memory Treatment (Treatment 1) 
choosing not to start a new business at all in the experiment, which causes that no useful 
insight into Bayesian updating can be obtained from them. Therefore, to make sure that there 
are sufficient usable data, there was a short period (less than a day) when all subjects were 
assigned to Treatment 1. Overall, there are 101 subjects in High Risk & Imperfect Memory 
Treatment (Treatment 1), 73 subjects in Low Risk & Imperfect Memory Treatment 
(Treatment 2), and 75 subjects in High Risk & Perfect Memory Treatment (Treatment 3).  
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I. Descriptive Statistics 
Even though numbers of participants differ among three treatments, distributions of race, 
age, gender, income levels, and ability levels are very similar across three treatments (see 
Table 4 below). A series of two sample t tests or tests of proportion are performed to check 
whether difference between means of certain variables in two of three treatments is equal to 
zero. First, by comparing the average ages across three treatments, there is no evidence to 
prove that the average age is different among three treatments. Same conclusion holds true 
for almost all race categories, except for the More than one race category. Treatment 2 has 
more subjects with more than one race than Treatment 1 and 2, with p-value equal to 0.017 
and 0.049, respectively. Females and males are evenly distributed in the sample. There is no 
subject with annual income higher than $250,000. Treatment 2 has more subjects with annual 
income under $49,000 than Treatment 3 with p-value equal to 0.071, meaning that the 
difference is statistically significant given 10% significance level. Meanwhile, Treatment 2 
has fewer subjects in the $50,000-$99,999 income level than Treatment 3 with p-value equal 
to 0.051, so the difference is statistically significant given 10% significance level. The 
standard of 10% significance level implies that it is possible that the differences in the 
income distribution are actually not statistically significant under 5% significance level. 
Though in three treatments, the average scores for the economic literacy test are very similar 
and the differences among them are not statistically significant at all, the distributions of 
subjects with High and Medium ability are different across three treatments. To be more 
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specific, Treatment 1 and Treatment 3 have similar proportions of subjects with High, 
Medium and Low ability. However, when comparing the proportion of subjects with High 
ability between Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 and between Treatment 2 and Treatment 3, we 
have p-value equal to 0.0142 and 0.0199, respectively. When comparing the proportion of 
subjects with Medium ability between Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 and between Treatment 2 
and Treatment 3, we have p-value equal to 0.0351 and 0.0914, respectively. Therefore, we 
can conclude that Treatment 2 has higher proportion of subjects with Medium ability and 
lower proportion of subjects with High ability.  
 
Table 4. Distribution of Sample Population across Race, Gender, Income and Ability 
    Treatment 
  1 2 3 
Age(average) 35.94 36.42 35.76 
      
Race(% of population)     
Caucasian American 83.20% 78.10% 81.30% 
Asian American 9.30% 2.73% 4.00% 
Hispanic/Latino 3.96% 5.48% 2.67% 
African American 4.95% 5.48% 9.33% 
Native American 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 
More than one race 0.99% 8.22% 1.33% 
      
Gender((% of population)     
Female 46.50% 57.50% 49.30% 
      
Income(% of population)     
Under $49,999 67.30% 74.00% 60.00% 
$50,000 - $99,999 22.80% 19.20% 33.30% 
$100,000 - $149,999 6.93% 4.11% 4.00% 
$150,000 - $249,999 2.97% 2.74% 2.67% 
$250,000 and over 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
      
Test Score 10.54 10.55 11.08 
Ability(% of population)     
High 34.70% 17.80% 34.70% 
Medium 24.80% 39.70% 26.70% 
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Low 40.60% 42.50% 38.70% 
 
Before proceeding to more complex analysis, the paper proposes that limited memory 
capacity could explain why subjects may fail to follow Bayes’ Rule. However, whether 
people encounter the limitation of storing memory during the short period of experiment is 
unknown. Therefore, the paper compares the difference between answers from memory 
questions and the corresponding correct answers to test whether this assumption holds. 
Additionally, it looks at whether the degree of forgetfulness differs between two imperfect 
memory treatments, Treatment 1 and Treatment 2. In Table 2, Diff(success) denotes the mean 
values of number of times the subjects think that they encountered success in the experiment 
subtracted by denotes the number of times success actually happened. Similarly, Diff(good) is 
equal to the average number of times subjects think that they encountered good economic 
condition subtracted by the actual number. The null hypothesis assumes that the differences 
are zero.  
 
Table 54. Difference between answers and correct answers to two memory questions 
  Overall Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Diff(success) 0.6322*** 0.7228*** 0.5068*** 
Diff(good) 0.9195*** 0.8316*** 1.0411*** 
Note: * denotes p-value less than 10%; ** denotes p-value less than 5%; *** denotes p-value less than 1%. 
From table 5, as these differences are statistically significant under 1% significance level, 
then there is sufficient evidence to conclude that what people remember is different from 
what actually happened. Results from one sample t-test show that people from both 
treatments overestimate both the number of times they encountered good economic condition 
and the number of times they succeeded. Even though the magnitude of the differences seem 
                                                             
4 * denotes p-value less than 10%; ** denotes p-value less than 5%; *** denotes p-value less than 1%. 
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to vary, results from two sample t-test indicates differences among these magnitudes is not 
statistically significant, meaning that we cannot reject that subjects in both treatments have 
the same level of forgetfulness.  
 
II. Factors that affect the decision on starting a new business 
Part of the Hypothesis II and III in this paper looks at people’s risk-taking behaviors, 
specifically at the likelihood of a subject choosing to start a new business in the experiment. 
We hypothesize that subjects under higher risk level and imperfect memory condition are 
more likely to choose to start a new business. To determine the relationship between risk 
levels and the memory condition and the probability of starting a new business, this paper 
uses probit models and evaluate the marginal effects of these two factors in order to 
understand what other factors may affect risk-taking behaviors.  
Since every subject makes seven rounds of decision in this experiment, there are 1743 
observations in total used in the probit models. However, we recognize that not every 
decision was made independently in the experiment, so the paper also includes models with 
standard errors being clustered together by ID.  
There are five different probit models in this paper, sharing the same independent 
variable, whether to start a new business. Independent variable is set to 1 when participants 
choose the riskier option, starting a business, and to 0 when they choose the option with fixed 
payoff. Table 6 includes Model (1), (2) and (3), which are probit models with different 
independent variables. Results in Table 3 do not demonstrate coefficients for each variable, 
but the average marginal effect. The average marginal effect of certain variable is defined as 
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the mean value of marginal effects of this variable given various values of other controlled 
independent variables.  
Model (1) simply shows that being in Treatment 2 and 3 have statistically significant and 
positive effect on the probability of choosing to start a new business, compared to Treatment 
1. It implies that people are respectively 7.94% and 7.6% more likely to choose the riskier 
option when the risk is relatively low and when they have perfect memory of the past. 
Additionally, the magnitude of effects indicates that the lower risk condition drives risk-
taking behaviors more than perfect memory condition (0.0794 > 0.076). After data is 
clustered by ID, coefficients for Treatment 2 and 3 are less statistically significant as we 
expected because of the smaller sample size. 
 
Table 6. Marginal Analysis for Probit Models  
  (1) (2) (3) 
    cluster   cluster  cluster 
Treatment           
2 0.0794*** 0.0794* 0.0118 0.0118 0.0105 0.0105 
  (0.025) (0.048) (0.03) (0.056) (0.031) (0.054) 
3 0.076*** 0.076* 0.0592** 0.0592 0.0849*** 0.0849* 
  (0.025) (0.044) (0.024) (0.04) (0.024) (0.038) 
Ability           
Medium     -0.0151 -0.0151 -0.0136 -0.0136 
      (0.027) (0.049) (0.027) (0.048) 
Low     -0.083*** -0.083 -0.0557** -0.0557 
      (0.027) ;(0.055) (0.027) (0.048) 
Expected Return     0.0047*** 0.0047*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 
      (0.0008) (0.00160 (0.0008) (0.001) 
Race           
Asian         -0.16*** -0.16* 
          (0.056) (0.098) 
Hispanic         0.038 0.038 
          (0.047) (0.075) 
Black         -0.237*** -0.237** 
          (0.047) (0.092) 
More than one         -0.0233 -0.0233 
          (0.059) (0.079) 
Income           
$50,000 - $99,999         -0.0688*** -0.0688 
          (0.026) (0.045) 
$100,000 - $149,999         0.108*** 0.108** 
          (0.038) (0.05) 
$150,000 - $249,999         0.0044 0.0044 
          (0.068) (0.076) 
Gender         -0.032 -0.032 
          (0.021) (0.034) 
Age         0.002** 0.002 
          (0.001) (0.0015) 
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Note:  Numbers in parenthesis denote standard errors for marginal effects. 
* denotes p-value less than 10%; ** denotes p-value less than 5%; *** denotes p-value less than 1%. 
 
 After adding Ability variable and Expected Return variable in Model (2), we can see that 
the coefficient for Medium ability and Treatment 2 are not statistically significant. It means 
that when controlling for other variables, participants with High and Medium ability have the 
same probability of taking risk and are 8.3% more likely to choose to enter into 
entrepreneurship than ones with Low Ability. Also, adding the Expected Return variable 
silences the effect of Treatment 2 because the major difference between Treatment 1 and 
Treatment 2 is expected return itself, affected by the design of probability of success and the 
payoff scheme. We can see that controlling for all other variables, one cent increase in 
expected payoff increases the probability of choosing to start a new business by 0.48%.  
Adding more demographic variables in Model (3) controls for individual difference.  
The result shows that all else equal, Asian Americans and African Americans are respectively, 
16% and 23.7%, less likely to choose the riskier option, compared with Caucasian 
Americans. Also, all else equal, compared to subjects with income under $49,999, it is 
unexpected subjects in the $50,000 – 99,999 high income group are actually 6.88% less likely 
to choose to start a new business, while subjects with income $100,000 - $149,999 are 10.8% 
more likely to choose to start a new business. Additionally, Model (3) indicates that with all 
else equal, older subjects are more likely to choose to start a new business with probability 
increasing 0.2% as the subject gets one year older. Model (3) shows slight different results 
from Model (1) and (2). With other variables constant, the magnitude of marginal effect of 
Treatment 3 becomes greater and increases to 8.49%, whereas the magnitude of marginal 
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effect of Low Ability decreases from 8.3% to 5.57%. Additionally, most variables that are 
statistically significant when observations are treated independently remains statistically 
significant even after observations being clustered.  
Then, we precede the analysis of what factors affect people’s decision on starting a new 
business by introducing the time factor, number of round. People in different treatments and 
with different ability may have different patterns of making decision over time. In model (4), 
including new variable does not affect the sign, statistical significance, or even the magnitude 
of effect of previously included variables. 
 
Table 7. Marginal Analysis on More Probit Models 
 (4) (5) 
    cluster   cluster 
Treatment      
2 0.0102 0.0102   
  (0.031) (0.054)   
3 0.0849*** 0.0849** 0.0718*** 0.0718** 
  (0.024) (0.0380 (0.021) (0.034) 
Ability      
Medium -0.0136 -0.0136   
  (0.027) (0.048)   
Low -0.56** -0.56 -0.0626*** -0.0626 
  (0.027) (0.048) (0.022) (0.039) 
Expected Return 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 
  (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0013) 
Race      
Asian -0.159*** -0.159* -0.155*** -0.155 
  (0.056) (0.098) (0.055) (0.096) 
Hispanic 0.037 0.037   
  (0.047) (0.075)   
Black -0.237*** -0.237*** -0.238*** -0.238*** 
  (0.047) (0.092) (0.047) (0.09) 
More than one -0.0228 -0.0228   
  (0.058) (0.079)   
Income      
$50,000 - $99,999 -0.069*** -0.069 -0.0816*** -0.0816* 
  (0.0260 (0.045) (0.025) (0.046) 
$100,000 - $149,999 0.106*** 0.106** 0.104*** 0.104* 
  (0.038) (0.05) (0.038) (0.048) 
$150,000 - $249,999 0.0045 0.0045   
  (0.068) (0.076)   
Gender -0.032 -0.032   
  (0.021) (0.0340   
Age 0.002** 0.002** 0.0019* 0.0019 
  (0.001) (0.0015) (0.001) (0.0015) 
Num Round      
2 -0.0767** -0.0767** -0.06** -0.06** 
  (0.037) (0.032) (0.03) (0.027) 
3 -0.0505 -0.0505   
  (0.0370) (0.0310)   
4 -0.0131 -0.0131   
  (0.036) (0.029)   
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5 0.0038 0.0038   
  (0.036) (0.028)   
6 -0.0875** -0.0875*** -0.0708** -0.0708*** 
  (0.038) (0.029) (0.031) (0.024) 
7 -0.0235 -0.0235   
  (0.036) (0.03)     
Note:  Numbers in parenthesis denote standard errors for marginal effects. 
* denotes p-value less than 10%; ** denotes p-value less than 5%; *** denotes p-value less than 1%. 
 
Results show that controlling for all other variables, subjects in round 2 and 6 are 
respectively, 7.67% and 8.75% less likely to choose to start a new business than in round 1. 
Model (5) is a reduced model, excluding all variables with statistically insignificant 
coefficients. In this reduced model, relationships between independent variables and the 
probability of choosing to start a new business remain unchanged. Even though there is no 
evidence showing consistent trend of reducing probability of taking risk over time, we at least 
know that subjects in later rounds modify their behaviors and tend to take less risk.  
 To further understand how the risk taking behaviors change overtime, we look at 
predicted probabilities of choosing to start a new business. These predicted values are 
marginal effects at mean and obtained by setting the Number of Round, Treatment, and 
Ability variables equal to an exact value specified below and setting other independent 
variables equal to their means. Within all three treatment and three ability levels, we can see 
that the probability of choosing the riskier option decreases in the round two, increases from 
round three to round five, and then decreases in round six. Then, the probability rises again in 
the final round. Therefore, round two and six are turning points for the decision on taking risk 
or not. However, in this paper, we could not find reasonable explanations on why round two 
and six are different from any other rounds. The fact that round 2 is right after the first round 
and round 6 is right before the last round may contribute such trend. 
 In conclusion, from analysis above, our hypothesis that people take more risk under 
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higher risk environment and with imperfect memory condition seems false. On the contrary, 
evidence from data supports that no matter what skill levels subjects have, they tend to take 
more risk when the risk level is lower and when they have the perfect memory of their past 
performance. Inconsistency from past literature could be because people update their absolute 
ability in the experiment not relative ability. However, another more convincing reason is that 
people are actually more overconfident in Treatment 2 & 3 and thus, are more likely to 
choose the riskier option. We hypothesize that people are even more overconfident under 
higher risk level and imperfect memory condition, but before formals test, the relationships 
between overconfidence and risk level or memory condition remain unclear. 
Table 8.  
Predicted Probabilities across Number of Rounds 
  Number of Round 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Treatment        
1 0.723 0.638 0.665 0.708 0.726 0.628 0.694 
2 0.808 0.736 0.759 0.795 0.81 0.727 0.784 
3 0.817 0.747 0.769 0.805 0.819 0.738 0.793 
Ability        
High 0.823 0.754 0.777 0.811 0.826 0.746 0.8 
Medium 0.788 0.713 0.737 0.775 0.791 0.703 0.763 
Low 0.736 0.652 0.678 0.721 0.739 0.642 0.707 
 
Predicted Probabilities across Ability Levels 
  Ability     
  High Medium Low 
Treatment    
1 0.739 0.696 0.634 
2 0.821 0.786 0.732 
3 0.83 0.795 0.744 
 
Even though average marginal effects indicate that risk condition has greater impact on 
taking risk behaviors, predicted values (marginal effect at mean) from Table 8, show that no 
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matter what ability level we talk about, people in Treatment 3 are 0.9% more likely to choose 
to take risk than Treatment 2, which means that perfect memory condition drives slightly 
more people to take risk than lower risk level. Additionally, other variables, expected return, 
race, and income levels all seem to have greater impact on risk-taking behaviors than risk 
level of external environment or perfect memory condition.  
 
III. Bayes’ Rule Analysis 
This paper investigates whether people follow Bayes’ Rule from three aspects. It first 
looks for evidence of violation of Bayes’ Rule and overconfidence within three treatments 
and compare in which treatment subjects follow Bayes’ Rule more closely. Then, it looks at 
whether subjects follow the Bayes’ Rule under good economic environment and if not, 
whether they actually Bayesian update their beliefs as if the economic condition is unknown. 
Also, it examines whether people follow Bayes’ Rule when hearing good news but fail to do 
so when hearing bad news. Finally, regression models with difference between actual beliefs 
and true beliefs as independent variables are run to model how treatment, the economic 
environment and the outcome of a decision affect the departure from Bayes’ Rule.  
Treatments. To find evidence of violation of Bayes’ Rule, subjects’ actual beliefs 
obtained from answers to the beliefs questions in the current round are compared with their 
true beliefs, which are calculated based on the outcome, the economic condition, and answers 
to the belief questions in the previous round using Bayes’ Rule.  
In Figure 1, we can see that subjects in Treatment 1 with High ability underestimate 
themselves having High ability, but overestimate themselves having Low ability. However, 
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results in Table 9 suggest that it is the beliefs about having Medium ability that subjects with 
High ability underestimate. Meanwhile, clear evidence from both graphs and hypothesis 
testing suggests that subjects in Treatment 1 with Low ability overestimate themselves having 
High ability by 6.415%, but underestimate their chance of having Low ability by 6.474%. 
Subjects in Treatment 1 with Medium ability update their beliefs quite consistently with 
Bayes’ Rule, but also tend to present slight underconfidence because their actual beliefs of 
having Low ability are higher than beliefs they should hold following Bayes’ Rule by 
2.096%, though the difference is not statistically significant under 5% significance level but 
10% significance level. Additionally, we cannot see clear distinction among beliefs about 
having Medium ability across three ability levels in Treatment 1, which could be because of 
subjects’ starting point and this paper could not provide viable explanation. 
Figure 1 
 
  Table 9. Different between Actual Beliefs and True Beliefs(Treatment 1) 
  High Risk & Imperfect Memory 
 num obs High num obs Medium num obs Low 
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Belief High 193 -0.842 127 -0.862 169 6.415*** 
Belief Medium 193 -3.222*** 127 -1.234 169 0.0594 
Belief Low 193 4.064*** 127 2.096* 169 -6.474*** 
Note:  Belief Ability = Actual Beliefs – True Beliefs 
* denotes p-value less than 10%; ** denotes p-value less than 5%; *** denotes p-value less than 1%. 
Figure 2 below shows the belief updating pattern of subjects in Treatment 2. Similar to 
subejcts in Treatment 1, subjects in Treatment 2 with High ability tend to be underconfident 
and subjects with Low ability tend to be overconfident. Unlike Treatment 1, however, graphs 
in Figure 2 shows that the difference between actual beliefs and true Beliefs seems to become 
smaller at the end of the experiment. Also, the updating patter of beliefs about having Medium 
ability is more obvious; subejcts with Medium ability follow Bayes’ Rule quite well.  
Figure 2. 
 
 
Table 10. Different between Actual Beliefs and True Beliefs(Treatment 2) 
  Low Risk & Perfect Memory 
 num obs High num obs Medium num obs Low 
Belief High 67 0.381 160 2.064* 167 5.565*** 
Belief Medium 67 -1.894* 160 -1.624* 167 -0.26 
Belief Low 67 1.512** 160 -0.44 167 -5.304** 
Note:  Belief Ability = Actual Beliefs – True Belief 
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* denotes p-value less than 10%; ** denotes p-value less than 5%; *** denotes p-value less than 1%. 
 
 Results from Table 10 confirm above statements. Subejcts with High ability are not 
as undercconfident as ones in Treatment 1 (1.512 < 4.064) and subejcts with Low ability are 
also less overconficent, only overestimating beliefs about having high ability by 5.565%.  
The magnitude of the difference between actual and true beliefs is smaller in Treatment 2 
than Treatment 1. The differences between actual and true beliefs for subjects with Medium 
ability is statistically significant under 10% significance level but not under 5% significance 
level. It implies that subjects with Medium ability in Treatment 2 still follow Bayes’ Rule if 
we want to be more cautious about type I error and choose 5% significance level. But under 
10% significance level, in Treatment 2, we rejct the null hypothesis and conclude that 
subjects with Medium ability fail to follow Bayes’ Rule and tend to be overconfident. 
Figure 3 
 
Figure 3 below continue providing consistent evidence supporting overconfidence 
presented among subjects with Low ability and underconfidence presented among subjects 
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with High ability and results from Table 3 confirm it. It also shows clearer difference than 
Figure 1 that subjects with Medium ability are underconfident. Their true beliefs about 
having medium ability are larger than the actual beliefs, whereas their actual beliefs about 
having Low ability are greater than the true levels across all seven rounds of updating.  
 
Table 11. Different between Actual Beliefs and True Beliefs(Treatment 3) 
  High Risk & Perfect Memory 
 num obs High num obs Medium num obs Low 
Belief High 153 -1.863** 110 1.75 140 6.359*** 
Belief Medium 153 -1.407** 110 -4.066*** 140 -0.306 
Belief Low 153 3.27*** 110 2.317** 160 -6.05*** 
Note:  Belief Ability = Actual Beliefs – True Beliefs 
* denotes p-value less than 10%; ** denotes p-value less than 5%; *** denotes p-value less than 1%. 
 
 In Table 11, for subjects with Medium ability, on average, actual beliefs about 
having Medium ability is 4.066% lower than true beliefs, whereas actual beliefs about having 
Low ability is 2.317% higher than true beliefs. The magnitude of underconfidence among 
subjects with Medium ability in Treatment 3 is larger than the magnitude in other two 
treatments. Also, only in Treatment 3, subjects with High ability not only present the same 
underconfidence pattern as Treatment 1 and 2 but also fail to update beliefs about having 
High ability correctly. Even subjects with Low ability in Treatment tend to be not as 
overconfident as ones in Treatment 1. As s result, we can generalize that subjects with perfect 
memory are more cautious than ones without perfect memory. 
Comparing across three treatments, we can see that subjects with Medium ability are better at 
following Bayes’ Rule in Treatment 1 and present the tendency to be overconfident in 
Treatment 2 but become underconfident in Treatment 3. It means that lower risk condition 
causes people with Medium ability to be more overconfident. Subjects with High ability are 
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able to follow Bayes’ Rule to update beliefs about themselves having High ability in 
Treatment 1 and 2, but fail to do so when updating beliefs about having Medium or Low 
ability. Subjects with Low ability’s belief updating behaviors deviate from Bayes’ Rule, but 
the difference seems to converge to zero over time in Treatment 2 and 3 (See graphs in 
Appendix Figure 1-3). By looking at the magnitude of the values in Table 6 – 8, we can 
conclude that subjects with Low ability in Treatment 3 deviate less from Bayes’ Rule than 
ones in Treatment 1 and 2 and perfect memory condition drives them to become less 
overconfident. Subjects with High ability in Treatment 1 tend to be even less underconfident 
than ones in Treatment 2. It implies that higher risk condition seems to affect people with 
High ability to be more cautious and those subjects with High ability seem to not know how 
to update beliefs about Medium ability. It could be subjects tend to be better at dealing with 
extreme beliefs, which are beliefs about having High or Low ability.  
 
Economic Environment. We also want to know the belief updating patterns under good or bad 
economic environment. A new variable, Unknown, is generated by performing Bayes’ Rule 
calculations again but with economic condition set to unknown, 50% chance for good 
economic environment and 50% chance for bad economic environment. It is added because 
we want to know whether people follow Bayes’ Rule assuming unknown economic 
environment when they fail do so under good economic environment, .  
Figure 4 suggests that when updating beliefs about having High ability, subjects with 
High and Medium ability integrate information about the economic condition correctly and 
follow Bayes’ Rule closely under any economic condition. The (straight) line that describes 
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the updating pattern of subejcts with Low ability moves more correspondingly with the (wide 
dashed) line labelled as Unknown, than the (dashed) line plotting true beliefs. It implies that 
subejcts with Low ability see the economic condition as unknown, but there is still gap 
existing between line of actual beliefs and other two lines. It implies that failing to recognize 
the impect of economic environment on the outcomes could not fully explain the departure 
from Bayes’ Rule.  
Figure 4. 
 
 
Results from Table 12 presents some different arguments; people with High ability 
follow Bayes’ Rule correctly under any economic evironment, except being underconfident 
when facing bad economic environment in Treatment 3 probably because of the extra 
cautiousness caused by the perfect memory condition. People with Medium ability, however, 
actually fail to recognize the good economic environment but see it as unknown. After 
adjusting the economic environment into unknown, some differences becomes smaller and 
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statistically significant but some still are statistically significant, which means there are 
probably other reasons accounted for the departure from Bayes’ Rule. Additionally, under bad 
economic condition, subjects with Low ability seem to be better at following Bayes Rule as 
the magnitude of the differences are smaller, which in some degree indicates that people with 
Low ability are better at Bayesian updating under bad economic environment. It is somewhat 
consistent with the hypothesis of this paper that people follow Bayes’ Rule under bad 
economic environment. 
 
Table 12. Different between Actual Beliefs and True Beliefs about High Ability 
      Num Obs Belief High Unknown 
Good 
Overall   625 3.46*** 1.77** 
Treatment 1 
High 88 -0.529   
Medium 63 3.75** 1.58 
Low 78 9.25*** 8.19*** 
Treatment 2 
High 34 1.5   
Medium 76 3.75*** 2.18** 
Low 83 4.48* 3.68 
Treatment 3 
High 79 -0.298  
Medium 51 -0.382  
Low 73 8.04** 7.1** 
Bad 
Overall   661 1.11   
Treatment 1 
High 105 -1.1   
Medium 64 -5.41** -3.24 
Low 91 3.98* 4.74** 
Treatment 2 
High 33 -0.77   
Medium 84 0.54  
Low 84 6.64*** 7.315*** 
Treatment 3 
High 74 -3.53*** -0.66 
Medium 59 3.59* 5.66*** 
Low 67 4.53   
Note:  Belief High = Actual Beliefs about having High Ability– True Beliefs about having High ability 
* denotes p-value less than 10%; ** denotes p-value less than 5%; *** denotes p-value less than 1%. 
 
 In Figure 5, when the economic condition is good, the (red straight) line that represents 
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the belief updating behaviors of subjects with High ability is closer to the one representing 
true beliefs under unknown economic condition. Then, when the economic condition is bad, 
the line of actual beliefs and the line of true beliefs move together. The same conclusion 
holds true for subjects with Low ability. We can see that the (yellow straight) line of actual 
beliefs for subjects with Low ability almost overlaps with the (red wide dashed) line of true 
beliefs under unknown economic condition. However, under bad economic condition, the line 
of actual beliefs for subjects with Low ability and the line of true beliefs move together. Both 
cases support the hypothesis that people update beliefs as if the economic condition is 
unknown when facing good economic condition. Even though the deviations from the same 
type of bias, the direction of deviations in two cases is different. Subjects with High ability, 
again, have a consistent tendency to be underconfident, whereas subjects with Low ability 
have tendency toward overconfidence. Additionally, the shape of the line of the belief 
updating pattern of subjects with Medium ability is more similar to the shape of the line for 
true beliefs than the line for true beliefs under unknown economic condition. It indicates that 
for subjects with Medium ability, the deviation between actual beliefs and true beliefs could 
not be explained by economic condition factor.   
Figure 5 
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Testing results from Table 13 illustrate similar updating pattern, which reinforces the 
conclusion that under bad economic environment, subjects tend to use Bayes’ Rule to update 
their beliefs. However, combining evidence from both graphs and hypothesis testing, the 
argument that subjects see the economic environment as unknown does not explain why 
subjects with High and Medium ability underestimate themselves having Medium ability. 
Table 13. Different between Actual Beliefs and True Beliefs about Medium Ability 
      Belief Medium Unknown 
Good 
Overall   -1.21** -1.84*** 
Treatment 1 
High -4.58*** -3.46*** 
Medium -0.216  
Low 1.61   
Treatment 2 
High -2.96*** -1.99** 
Medium -3.15*** -3.02*** 
Low 1.99   
Treatment 3 
High -2.46*** -1.04 
Medium -2.91** -1.7 
Low 0.7   
Bad 
Overall   -1.73*** -1.2** 
Treatment 1 
High -2.09* -3.27** 
Medium -2.24  
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Low -1.27   
Treatment 2 
High -0.79   
Medium -0.24  
Low -2.49   
Treatment 3 
High -0.282  
Medium -5.07*** -4.86*** 
Low -1.4   
Note: Belief Medium = Actual Beliefs about having Medium Ability– True Beliefs about having Medium ability 
* denotes p-value less than 10%; ** denotes p-value less than 5%; *** denotes p-value less than 1%. 
  There is no obvious evidence in Figure 6 supporting the statement that people act like 
the economic condition is unknown. Subjects with High ability clearly present 
underconfidence. From the graphs, subjects with Medium ability follow Bayes’ Rule closely. 
However, subjects with Low ability are more overconfident under good economic 
environment than under bad economic environment.  
Figure 6 
 
Table 14. Different between Actual Beliefs and True Beliefs about Low Ability 
      Belief Low Unknown 
Good 
Overall   -2.25*** 0.07 
Treatment 1 
High 5.1*** 6.17*** 
Medium -3.54** 0.74 
Low -10.86*** -6.7** 
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Treatment 2 
High 1.46** 2.33*** 
Medium -0.6  
Low -6.47** -3.43 
Treatment 3 
High 2.76*** 3.64*** 
Medium 3.29** 4.93*** 
Low -8.73*** -4.52 
Bad 
Overall   0.63   
Treatment 1 
High 3.19*** 1.75** 
Medium 7.64*** 5.03** 
Low -2.72   
Treatment 2 
High 1.57   
Medium -0.3  
Low -4.15* -6.66** 
Treatment 3 
High 3.82*** 2.42** 
Medium 1.47  
Low -3.13   
Note: Belief Low = Actual Beliefs about having Low Ability– True Beliefs about having Low ability 
* denotes p-value less than 10%; ** denotes p-value less than 5%; *** denotes p-value less than 1%. 
Results in Table 14 demonstrate that overall, people update their beliefs about having 
Low ability as if the economic environment is unknown as the difference becomes 
statistically insignificant. Also, overall, as the difference is not statistically insignificant under 
the bad economic environment, then we can conclude that people follow Bayesian updating 
under bad economic environment.  
 
Outcomes. Figure 7 – 9 presents actual and true beliefs about certain ability given outcomes 
of success or Failure. In Figure 7, subjects with High and Medium ability tend to follow 
Bayes’ Rule to update their beliefs when facing good news but fail to do so when facing bad 
news. They overestimate themselves having High ability given bad news. It implies the effort 
of maintaining positive self-image and neglecting new information. Subjects with Low ability 
are consistently overconfident, no matter what kind of outcome they observe.  
Figure 7 
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 Hypothesis testing in Table 15, however, points out that people with High ability tend to 
underestimate themselves having High ability given success but overestimate themselves 
having High ability given failure. Also, people with Medium ability Bayesian update their 
beliefs about having High ability given any outcome, except become underconfident when 
succeeding in a higher risk environment. The finding implies that people with High ability 
have tendency toward overreaction to new information.  
Figure 8 still support similar arguments from above. Despite the dramatic changes in the 
plots, lines of actual belief move more closely with lines of true beliefs in the success scenarios 
than the failure scenarios. Also, the differences seem to converge overtime given success. Table 
15 shows somewhat surprising results. People tend to be better at updating beliefs about having 
Medium ability given failure than success. When facing good news, people tend to 
underestimate themselves having Medium ability. It implies that people may go to extreme 
sides hearing new information, distributing more weight to beliefs about having High or Low 
ability.  
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Figure 8 
 
Figure 9 
 
 
Table 15. Difference between Actual Beliefs and True Beliefs given Different outcomes 
 
 
   Num Obs Belief High Belief Medium Belief Low 
Success 
Overall   798 -0.45 -2.19*** 2.64*** 
Treatment 1 
High 158 -3.33*** -2.36*** 5.69*** 
Medium 82 -3.13** -2.33* 5.46*** 
Low 41 0.91 2.7 -1.79 
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Treatment 2 
High 63 -0.86 -1.28 2.14*** 
Medium 125 1.61 -2.41*** 0.8 
Low 80 5.9** -1.47 -4.45* 
Treatment 3 
High 132 -3.1*** -1.29** 4.39*** 
Medium 76 -1.46 -4.29*** 5.75*** 
Low 41 8.8* -7.21** -1.59 
Failure 
Overall   488 6.67*** -0.33 -6.34*** 
Treatment 1 
High 35 10.38*** -7.1*** -3.27* 
Medium 45 3.27 0.76 -4.03 
Low 128 8.76*** -0.79 -7.97*** 
Treatment 2 
High 4 19.95* -11.54** -8.4 
Medium 35 3.69 1.19 -4.88 
Low 87 5.24** 0.853 -6.09** 
Treatment 3 
High 21 5.94** -2.17 -3.77 
Medium 34 8.93 -3.57 -5.36** 
Low 99 5.35** 2.55 -7.9*** 
Note: Belief Ability = Actual Beliefs – True Beliefs 
* denotes p-value less than 10%; ** denotes p-value less than 5%; *** denotes p-value less than 1%. 
 
  Figure 9 presents very interesting results. Subjects with High and Medium ability 
overestimate themselves having Low ability given success and underestimate themselves 
having Low ability given failure. It hints that they may not fully integrate signals about their 
actual skill level into their beliefs. Numerical results in Table 15 further illustrate that the 
differences are statistically significant for the most of times. People with Low ability are able 
to Bayesian update their beliefs about having Low ability given good news.  
 
Regression Models. Therefore, we understand that different treatments, different ability 
level, economic environment, and the outcome play into the belief updating pattern and explain 
people’s tendency to deviate from Bayesian updating. Regression models (Table 16) pull 
independent variables mentioned above together in order to find the magnitude of the effect of 
every variable. These models do not include a constant and Low ability and Round 7 are chosen 
as base level. We can see that independent variables included cannot explain why people fail 
to follow Bayes’ Rule updating beliefs about having Medium ability because coefficients in the 
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model are all statistically insignificant. Most dummy variables for Number of Rounds are not 
statistically significant, especially under 5% significance level. It means that we have no 
sufficient evidence to prove that the deviation from Bayesian updating reduces over time.  
 In the regression model for Diff. High, difference between actual and true beliefs about 
having High ability, absolute values of coefficients for Ability variables are smaller than 
absolute values of coefficients for Treatment variables. It means that Diff. High tend to be 
positive, actual belief greater than true belief, which represent overconfidence. In this model, 
positive coefficient for the Environment variable means that good economic environment 
causes people to be more overconfident. Meanwhile, negative coefficient for the Success 
variable means that when facing outcome of success, people tend to be less overconfident. 
However, in the model for Diff. Low, Diff. Low tends to be negative. Meanwhile, coefficients 
for Success and Environment have opposite signs from coefficients in the model of Diff. High. 
Therefore, Models of Diff. High and Diff. Low demonstrate same relationships between 
outcome of success and accuracy of Bayesian updating and between environment factor and 
accuracy of Bayesian updating.  
 
Table 16. Regression Models on Difference between Actual and True Beliefs 
 
  Diff. High Diff. Medium Diff. Low 
Treatment      
1 4.06** 0.47 -4.11** 
  (1.89) (1.56) (1.87) 
2 5.85*** 0.63 -6.48*** 
  (1.97) (1.63) (1.95) 
3 4.52** -0.12 -4.41** 
  (1.96) (1.62) (1.95) 
Ability       
High  -3.44** -1.28 4.72*** 
  (1.55) (1.28) (1.53) 
Medium -2.64* -1.53 4.17 
  (1.44) (1.19) (1.43) 
Success -6.58*** -1.43 8*** 
  (1.35) (1.11) (1.34) 
Environment 3.71*** 0.62 -4.33*** 
  (1.15) (0.95) (1.14) 
47 
 
Num Round      
1 3.51* -1.49 -2.01 
  (2.05) (1.69) (2.03) 
2 2.99 -2.4 -0.59 
  (2.11) (1.74) (2.08) 
3 0.39 0.76 -1.15 
  (2.09) (1.72) (2.07) 
4 3.02 0.52 -3.54 
  (2.06) (1.7) (2.04) 
5 0.77 -0.97 0.2 
  (2.05) (1.69) (2.03) 
6 1.1 2.49 -3.58* 
  (2.11) (1.75) (2.09) 
Note:  Diff. Ability = Actual Beliefs – True Beliefs 
Numbers in parenthesis denote standard errors for coefficients. 
* denotes p-value less than 10%; ** denotes p-value less than 5%; *** denotes p-value less than 1%. 
 
 Marginal analysis helps to understand marginal effect of treatments and ability level. ME 
at mean in Table 10 denotes the marginal effect of certain treatment given other independent 
variables at their mean values. From Table 10, we can conclude that lower risk condition 
causes people, especially people with Medium and Low ability, deviate more from Bayesian 
updating than the perfect memory condition. Perfect memory condition drives people less 
confident than imperfect memory condition.  
 
Table 17. Predicted Values for Difference between Actual and True Beliefs 
    Diff. High Diff. Medium Diff. Low 
Treatment 1 
ME at mean 1.56* -1.61** 0.049 
High 0.038 -2** 1.96* 
Medium 0.84 -2.26** 1.42 
Low 3.48*** -0.72 -2.75** 
Treatment 2 
ME at mean 3.35*** -1.02 '-2.32** 
High 1.83 -1.42 -0.41 
Medium 3.63** -1.67 -0.95 
Low 5.26*** -0.14 5.12*** 
Treatment 3 
ME at mean 2.02** -1.77** -0.25 
High 0.5 -2.17** 1.67 
Medium 1.3 -2.42** 1.12 
Low 3.94*** -0.89 -3.05** 
Note: Diff. Ability = Actual Beliefs – True Beliefs 
* denotes p-value less than 10%; ** denotes p-value less than 5%; *** denotes p-value less than 1%. 
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6 Conclusion 
 Data collected from human subjects recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk provides 
important insights into how people update beliefs about their attributes that they care about 
but have little knowledge of. We learn that people tend to take more risk when the external 
environment is less risky. They also choose to take more risk when they can remember their 
past performance. Also, lower risk condition drives people with Medium ability to become 
overconfident and allows people with High ability to be less underconfident, while higher 
risk condition drives people with Low ability even more overconfident. Meanwhile, the 
perfect memory condition causes people with High and Medium ability become more 
underconfident, but does not affect people with Low ability.  
 Overall, people are better at Bayesian updating under bad external environment and 
given good news, which is consistent with the hypothesis of this paper. The argument that 
people update beliefs as if the external environment is unknown under good external 
environment can partially explain the difference between actual beliefs and true beliefs. There 
are a few surprising results. People with High ability generally are able to follow Bayes’ Rule 
to update beliefs about having High ability no matter what the external environment is. 
People with Medium ability are able to Bayesian update their beliefs even given bad news but 
present underconfidence given good news. People with Low ability, however, tend to be 
overconfident under any condition.  
 Conclusions of this paper can provide plausible explanations for some entrepreneurial 
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behaviors. According to Åstebro, Herz, Nanda, and Weber (2014), individuals entering 
entrepreneurship despite low risk-adjusted returns suggests that standard theories of risk and 
return cannot fully explain entrepreneurship. It mentioned that past literature find some 
evidence of overconfidence in the form of optimism, overestimation, and overplacement that 
could explain entrepreneurial excess entry. As a result, this paper helps the understanding of a 
precise nature of overconfidence, overestimation. The experiment design not only focuses 
whether people overestimate their ability and rule out the possibility of optimism but also 
links certain ability, economic literacy, to the outcome of starting a new business, which 
allows the measure of one form of overconfidence, overestimation, directly related to 
entrepreneurship activities. The statistically significant and positive coefficient of the 
expected return variable in the probit model on the likelihood of choosing to start a new 
business tells us that overestimation increases expected return and therefore, would increase 
the chance of entrepreneurial entry. Meanwhile, this paper also finds evidence of 
overestimation in different scenarios, for example when given bad news. Therefore, excess 
entry into entrepreneurship can simply be explained by the fact that people overestimate their 
abilities. And insights from this paper allow improved understanding of entrepreneurial 
behaviors, which is important to productivity growth and helpful for making guiding policies 
for small businesses.  
 Results in this paper can also be used to rationalize the relationship between 
overconfidence and financial instability. According to Abbes (2013), overconfidence 
contributes to excessive trading volume of overconfident investors and excessive prices 
volatility, and therefore financial instability. In the book, Managing Risk in the Financial 
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System, the conclusion comments of Chapter 1 states that “the good news of the years up to 
2006 may have led to the bad news that started in 2007” (p. 14). Findings in this paper that 
people with Medium ability tend to become overconfident under low risk environment 
coincide with statements above. Before bubble builds up, people with Medium and Low 
ability become overconfident. The overconfidence causes volatility and thus, financial 
instability. Contrary to our previous hypothesis that higher risk condition causes 
overconfidence, the results suggest that overconfidence actually may precede the emergence 
of financial instability and higher risk condition.  
 However, there are limitations existing in this paper and a lot more to do for future 
research. The major problem is the selection bias. The paper perform analysis solely on 
subjects who choose the riskier option, so the studying sample could have certain type of 
subjects being over-represented. If with sufficient funding, a control group of having all 
subjects automatically choosing the riskier option should be added to capture the belief 
updating pattern of people who would have chosen not to start a new business. Also, in the 
process of collecting data on MTurk, some posts suggested people who have good economic 
knowledge to participate in the experiment, so the sample collected may not represent the 
whole population well. Larger stake or a different set of probability of success may generate 
different results. However, payoff scheme applied in this experiment is seen as being 
relatively lucrative for workers on MTurk and from some posts online, it provides monetary 
incentive for people to care about the "economic literacy" measured by the test, probably in 
the same way that entrepreneurs would care about their returns.  
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Appendix 
 
1. Full Set of Economic Literacy Test 
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2. Instructions and Screenshots for the experiment 
 
Treatment (High Risk, Perfect Memory) 
Below are screenshots from the webpage of the experiment. They show the instructions of 
High Risk & Perfect Memory Treatment.  
Then, participants proceed to seven rounds of decisions. Below is an example of what 
would happen if a participant chooses to not to start a new business.  
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After making a decision, since this participant chooses not to start a new business, there is 
not outcome of success or failure. Participants will be asked to answer a belief question again. 
 
Below is an example of what would happen if the participant chooses to start a new 
business.  
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Then, participants go to the next page to find out the outcome. In the same time, the round 
history creates the perfect memory condition. 
 
Screenshots of round 3 to round 6 are not included because they will be almost the same 
as previous ones. Below is an example of what the round history will be like after 7 rounds. 
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 After 7 rounds of decisions, participants will be told which round is paying round and their 
final payoff.  
 
 In the end, they will be asked to provide some demographic information as following: 
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Treatment (High Risk & Imperfect Memory) 
 Below are screenshots from the webpage of th experiment. They show the instructions 
of the High Risk & Imperfect Memory Treatment. 
The instructions in Decision page is below: 
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After making a decision, since this participant chooses not to start a new business, there is 
not outcome of success or failure. Participants will be asked to answer a belief question again. 
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 Then, participants will answer two memory questions to show how much they remember 
with cash incentive. 
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 After 7 rounds of decisions, participants will be told which round is paying round and their 
final payoff.  
 
In the end, they will be asked to provide some demographic information. For the race question, 
participants can choose all that apply.  
 
Treatment (Low Risk & Imperfect Memory) 
The screenshots for the Low Risk & Imperfect Memory Treatment is very similar to the 
screenshots fot the High Risk & Imperfect Treatment with only Decision page having a 
different set of probability of success and payoff scheme.  
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3. Figure 1 – 3 plot the differences between actual beliefs and true beliefs across 
treatments 
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